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Abstract. Selectional restrictions are semantic constraints on forming cer-
tain complex types in natural language. The paper gives an overview of
modeling selectional restrictions in a relational type systemwith morpho-
logical and syntactic types. We discuss some foundations of the system
and ways of formalizing selectional restrictions.
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1 Background
A type theory, whether simple or complex, is essential for a logical specifica-
tion of natural language (NL). In its complex form (i.e. as dependent and/or
polymorphic type theory), it is the most expressive logical system (contrasted
with the nonlogical ones such as set and category theory). As [Ash14, Luo10,
Luo14, Ran94] have shown, in a logical approach (i.e. in one with simpler al-
ternatives such as zeroth, first, second and higher order logic), complex type
theories outshine simpler ones in accounting for phenomena like anaphora, se-
lectional restrictions, etc. Also, as the notion of type is inherently semantic:
(i) type := category of semantic value,
it is by definition suited for analyzing universal phenomena in NL, as NL se-
mantics in largely universal (as witnessed by the possibility of translation from
any human language to another).
Type-theoretical modeling of NL has a long background, modeling selec-
tional restrictions less so. The latter topic, nearly overlooked in Montagovian
[Mon02] and categorial [Lam58] traditions, has been investigated only recently
[Ash14,Luo10]. The logical essence of the linguistic phenomenon of selectional
restrictions is fixing types for a function’s (or relation’s1) arguments. However,
put in this way, the notion is not even informally precise. There is a difference
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1 I will henceforth refer to them as “relations” (as functions are relations).
between (1) arguments conforming to selectional restrictions and (2) relations
imposing selectional restrictions to their arguments. Clearly, (1) and (2) are not
mutually exclusive, but if we consider (1) in isolation, it seems natural to admit
that an argument can conform to different selectional restrictions. For example,
the first argument of read might be a physical (Phy) and sentient entity, while
the second might be a physical and informational entity. On the other hand, if
we see selectional restrictions as being imposed by the relations, different selec-
tional restrictions for one argument position become less viable. One reason is
that multiple restrictions for an argument position cannot be directly computed
by a function. The second one is that multiple restrictions for an argument po-
sition suggest type polymorphism, which (for some reason or another) may
seem undesirable. For example, [Ash14]-style approach would not work with
multiple types per relation’s argument position.
There are several ways out of these two near-plights. As different proposi-
tions may hold per position, the first problem can be avoided by indirect com-
putations returning truth values. Alternatively, the computations might return
sets of restrictions instead of restrictions. The second problem can be diverted
with a type combining the properties of different types (e.g. with a ∑- or subset
type). This approach (with dot-types instead of ∑-types) has been pioneered
in [Luo10]. Upon a closer inspection, however, the idea of relations imposing
different restrictions per positions does not seem attractive. Besides the above-
mentioned (and other) complications, it seems unnecessary. For example, since
most sentient (like most informational) entities are also physical, the hypothe-
sis of restriction Phy being imposed by read can be substituted with that of a
statistical correlation. Indeed, counterexamples, e.g. reading ones mind/thoughts
or a program reading a data are available. On the other hand, a program can be
considered a physical object in computer memory and/or the counterexamples
can be dismissed altogether as derived metaphoric uses. However, metaphors
are pervasive in language, so it makes sense merely to say that a use is more
metaphoric than another, thus effacing a clear distinction between the original
and derived.
2 An overview of Z
In this paper, I develop some ideas about selectional restrictions in a relational
model of NL. In this framework, the basic unit of NL is a relation of a finite
(usually very small, ≤ 14) arity. Call the type system we are considering Z .
There are many universes in Z , some of which are listed in table 1:
Table 1. Main universes
M := the universe of morphosyntactic types (relations)
R := the universe of selectional restrictions
Phy, Inf, Ani, Sen, Cou, Mas... : R
Phy := physical entity
Inf := informational entity
Ani := animate entity
Sen := sentient entity
Cou := countable entity
Mas :=mass entity
Z is a relational type system for modeling NL syntax, morphology and compo-
sitional semantics. The system has no proper terms, its lowest-order elements
are types. The main universe in Z is that of morphosyntactic relationsM. We
can distinguish the subuniverse of nth-order typesMn inM, as well as subuni-
verses for any particular value of n. Note thatMn is not a lower-order universe
wrt.M, i.e. we do not haveMn : M, nor do we haveMn : Mn+m for any
m, n. Morphemes, words, phrases and sentences areMn-types. Starting from
the bottom, we have the following rules.
Morphemes as types:
a morpheme
a :Mn
MAP
MAP
MAP has a(n) (dis)advantage. The advantage is that it captures the natural
alignment between definition (i) and the definition of morphemes as smallest
meaningful NL units. The disadvantage is that invoking propositions-as-types
on MAP suggests an unnatural alignment of linguistic categories (morphemes
are not propositions in NL). However, morphemes are abstractions that can
be interpreted as propositions that morphemes are inhabited by morpheme
instances (or uses), so an abstract propositions-as-types interpretation is not
barred for morphemes.
Some morphemes are 0th-orderM-types (M0-types). AnM0-type is one
that occurs only in an argument position. Not all morphemes areM0-types.
For examples, stems have order order 0, while plural markers, as relations over
stems, have order 1.Mn-types are “natural” interpretations of particular mor-
phemes, words, phrases and sentences as linguistic expressions2. We claim that
they are interpreted as certain relations (e.g. a word is interpreted as a relation
involving the morphemes that it is composed of, a phrase is interpreted as a
2 Whenever a value is needed for n, it usually turns out to be very small, ≤ 14.
relation involving the words that it is composed of, etc.). This corresponds to
the usual principle of compositionality, as it is known since Frege. Higher-order
types (or universes) are linguistic categories that these interpretations inhabit,
e.g. V, N, NP, ACC, etc. (cf. Tab. 2).
ComplexMn-type formation:
c(a, e¯) 7→ a(e¯) a :Mn
a(e¯) :Mn
n-Form (n ≥ 1)
n-Form (n ≥ 1)
e¯ := a possibly empty finite sequence of types e1, ..., en
x(y) := a relation x over y
c(a, e¯) := an admissible concatenation of a, e1, ..., en in a NL
7→ := a parsing function
n-Form (n ≥ 1) conveys that if an admissible concatenation c(a, e¯) is parsed as
a(e¯), a(e¯) has typeMn. For every a(e¯), if the highest-order type among e1, ..., en
has order n, a and a(e¯) have order n+1. We conflate c(a, e¯) with a relation for-
mula inMn. The idea is that red book, livre rouge, etc., are relation formulas in
idiosyncratic notations (viz. English, French, etc.). As linguistic expressions are
relation formulas overMn, they are naturally parsed as relations.
How to decide whether a particular relation a(e¯) holds? Usually, one has a
basic intuition about what modifies what (modification is a subcase of relation).
The main sources for the intuition are morpheme or word classes and seman-
tic contribution tests. For example, -s modifies (i.e. is a relation over) work in
works rather than vice versa, as (1) affixes modify stems not vice versa, (2) per-
son/tense and plural markers modify flexibles rather than vice versa, and (3) -s
contributes to the meaning of work in works rather than vice versa. By a similar
argument, heavy modifies rain in heavy rain rather than vice versa, sleeps mod-
ifies john in john sleeps rather than vice versa, etc. In each case, there’s a clear
asymmetry between functions of the components, as conveyed by (1)-(2) the
functions of word and morpheme classes and (3) semantic contribution tests.
Elementary universe formation:
T in Tab. 2
T :M
EU-Form
(1)
Forming elementary universes requires a comprehensive list of morphosyntac-
tic categories. Some elementary universes are listed in the table below:
Table 2. Elementary universes
A := adjective
ACC := accusative
ADL := adverbial
ADP := adposition
X := core argument (from XP)
Complex universe formation and elimination:
a(b1, ...) :M a : A :M b1 : B :M
A(B, ...) :M
CU-Form
ar1,... : A :M b1 : B :M A(B, ...) :M b1 : r1 : R
ar1,...(b1, ...) :M
CU-Elim
ar1,...(b1, ...) should be read “a imposing selectional restriction r1 on its argument
b1 (and possibly more restrictions on other arguments)”. As all terms are types
in Z , (b1, ...) is an n-indexed sequence of arbitrary types (with b1 the first argu-
ment and B a universe it belongs to). A is a universe of relations, B a universe
of its arguments. Thus it would not make sense to consider A a relation over
B in A(B, ...). The latter is a notation for a more complex type, which can be
formalized in different ways (e.g. as a ∑- or ∏-type). The following examples
may be useful for a better understanding of the rules:
red(car) type red : A car : X
A(X) type
redPhy : A car : X A(X) type car : Phy
red(car) type
3 Formalizing selectional restrictions
We can compute selectional restrictions directly with a partial function
s :Mn → N → R, (2)
and reason about them with predicates
p : R → Prop, (3)
An important theorem about selectional restrictions is
∏(x :Mn)∏(y : N). 1 ≤ y ≤ ar(y)↔ p(s(x)(y)), (4)
where ar :Mn → N is the arity function. The theorem states that selectional
restrictions are imposed on all suitable argument positions of all suitable types.
The proof of the theorem is by cases (it has to be — to ensure that all the
suitable types have been set up correctly). Along with other similar theorems
and lemmas, this has been formalized for a tiny (but interesting) fragment of
Mn
3. Somewhat interestingly, all the main proofs there are identical. As al-
luded above, the main utility of the lemmas is to safeguard the formalization of
morphosyntactic types and their selectional restrictions. In addition, they help
to check answers to two interesting experimental questions, both dependent
on the definition of ‘selectional restrictions’: 1. Do all morphosyntactic types
with arity ≥ 1 project selectional restrictions? 2. Do morphosyntactic types that
project selectional restrictions project them for all their argument positions?
4 Conclusion
We have discussed the role of selectional restrictions in a relational type system
of morphosyntactic types. Our exposition differs in several aspects from those
of [Ash14, Luo10]. The main difference is that [Ash14, Luo10] consider selec-
tional restrictions as a purely semantic phenomenon, while the present model
focuses on syntax (and morphology — although I have not discussed the re-
lationship between morphology and selectional restrictions, which is yet un-
clear). Selectional restrictions form an interface between syntax and semantics,
guiding the formation of syntactic types from semantic consideration [Luu15].
This investigation, itself awork in progress, is a part of a largerwork in progress
on type system Z .
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